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Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly:
Price Competition with Managerial Delegation¤
Yasuhiko Nakamuray Tomohiro Inouez
Abstract
We introduce a managerial delegation contract into the model of B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007) and
examine its in°uence on a price-setting mixed duopoly in the context of the endogenous timing
problem. We obtain the result that the owners of both ¯rms prefer to set their own prices as
late as possible, and thus in equilibrium, the ¯rms choose their prices simultaneously in the
latter stage of the game. This is in contrast to the ¯ndings of B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007) that ¯rms
choose prices simultaneously in the former stage.
Keywords: mixed duopoly, managerial delegation, endogenous timing
JEL Classi¯cations: D43, L13, L32
1 Introduction
This study investigates the e®ects of a managerial delegation contract on the analysis of mixed
oligopoly when the timing of the ¯rms' moves is endogenous. An industry in which welfare-
maximizing public ¯rms compete with pro¯t-maximizing private ¯rms is usually referred to as a
mixed oligopoly. In the real world, despite the worldwide wave of privatization since 1980s, many
public ¯rms compete with private ¯rms in private goods markets. The analyses of mixed oligopoly
intend to explain the impact of public ¯rms and their privatization on market outcomes. The
literature of modern theoretical game analyses on mixed oligopolies can be traced back to a study
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of De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and it has o®ered logic to explain observed phenomenon in mixed
oligopolistic market.
The conventional literature on mixed oligopoly mainly assumes that the order of the ¯rms'
moves is exogenous. However, in recent years, there has emerged some literature on mixed oligopoly
that endogenizes the timing of the ¯rms' moves. Pal (1998), who has done pioneering work in this
¯eld assumed a situation in which ¯rms decided quantities and obtained strikingly di®erent results
from those in a corresponding private oligopoly, namely, that the public ¯rm can be the follower
in equilibrium. Matsumura (2003) and Lu (2006) also considered the issue of endogenous timing
in mixed oligopoly. They extended Pal's (1998) model to investigate the situation in which a
domestic public ¯rm competes with foreign private ¯rms. Although most of the literature assumed
the quantity-setting game, B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007) considered the model where a public ¯rm and
a private ¯rm, whose goods are substitutes, choose their prices sequentially or simultaneously.
The above-mentioned papers adopt the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) to
determine the endogenous decision of ¯rms' moves, and thus, in the models of the four papers, the
¯rms simultaneously decide in an initial stage to move early or late and then play in subsequent
stages, based on these timing decisions.
This study examines how a managerial delegation contract a®ects the above results. We con-
sider the contract µa la Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987). They explicitly modeled the
interaction between internal owner-manager contracting and external strategic market competition,
according to which, the ¯rms' owners who aim to maximize their own pro¯ts hire managers who
do not pro¯t-maximize. Both of Fershtman and Judd and Sklivas considered two-stage duopoly
games where, at the ¯rst stage, owners choose managerial incentive contracts for managers and in
the second stage managers compete in the duopolistic market. The Fershtman-Judd-Sklivas model
has become popular and has been applied to competition among private ¯rms.1 As described later,
we model the managerial delegation based on Lambertini (2000). Considering such a delegation
contract, we analyze a case in which the public sector indirectly manages its ¯rm by delegating
managerial decision-making to an agent, in contrast to the conventional analysis in which all man-
agerial decision-making is directly carried out by the public sector. In this regard, however, there
exist a few studies on managerial delegation in mixed oligopoly. Barros (1995) and White (2001)
were based on Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) regarding the basic structures of
the models and assumed that each of the owners provided a linear combination of pro¯t and sales
1Fershtman et al. (1991), Polo and Tedeschi (1992), B¶arcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza (1996) and Lambertini
(2000) also considered the interplay between market competition and the internal organization of the ¯rm in the
fashion of Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987).
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revenue as a managerial incentive contract to their managers.2 However, they considered simulta-
neous quantity competition as well as most works on mixed oligopoly. Thus, Nakamura and Inoue
(2007), our companion study, examined the e®ects of the managerial delegation through compar-
isons with Pal (1998), who analyzed the endogenous timing in quantity-setting mixed oligopoly.
In that study, we showed that the delegation contract does not a®ect the equilibrium timing of
quantity-settings and proved the robustness of the result in Pal (1998).
In this paper, we provide the analysis on a price-setting mixed duopoly with the managerial
delegation contract. As mentioned above, since B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007) examined the endogenous
timing in a price-setting mixed duopoly, we clarify the role of the delegation contract in mixed
oligopoly by comparing our results with B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007). Under price competition with substi-
tute goods, the ¯rms have upward-sloping reaction functions unlike the case of strategic substitutes
in a quantity setting.
We explicitly recognize separation of ownership from management and analyze the game with
the stage at which owners provide their managers with incentives that deviate from pro¯t maxi-
mization, unlike a simple observable delay game in the context of a price-setting mixed duopoly
in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007). Thus, in our model, each ¯rm's manager decides his or her own price
in the market competition. In the literature on private duopoly, Lambertini (2000) adopted the
same approach as ours. He ¯rst addressed the issue of the timing for deciding strategic variables
(prices/outputs) by each ¯rm's manager in the observable delay game between managerial ¯rms.
We also take the same approach concerning managerial delegation. Speci¯cally, the owners of
¯rms provide the incentive contract as a linear combination of the pro¯t ¦i and sales qi to their
managers. Each manager sets prices to maximize his or her own payo® in terms of the incentive
contract provided by the owner. Our interest lies in whether the result in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007)
varies or not by introducing the managerial delegation. The result is striking and surprising. We
show that the public and private ¯rm set prices simultaneously in the later stage, since it is a
dominant strategy for the two owners to set prices as late as possible. This result is in contrast to
that in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007), in which a public ¯rm and a private ¯rm set prices as soon as pos-
sible when both of them are entrepreneurial. Our result, as well as that of B¶arcena-Ruiz, justi¯es
and explains the reasoning behind the assumption in most of the literature on price-setting mixed
oligopoly that all ¯rms simultaneously set their own prices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the basic setting, and
2Nishimori and Ogawa (2005) also applied the managerial delegation contract to the mixed oligopolistic setting.
They extended the intertemporal contract decision in a private duopoly by B¶arcena-Ruiz and Paz Espinoza (1996)
into the mixed duopolistic case.
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in Section 3 we analyze three types of competition of ¯xed timing and present the equilibrium of
our model. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2 Setting
We adopt a simpli¯ed version of the linear demand model initiated by Dixit (1979) and applied
by Singh and Vives (1984). We have an economy composed of a monopolistic sector with a public
¯rm and a private ¯rm, and a competitive sector producing the numeraire good. Each of the ¯rms
produces a di®erentiated good in the monopolistic sector. In the rest of this paper, we often refer
to the public ¯rm as Firm 0 (private ¯rm as Firm 1) and the owner of the public ¯rm as Owner
0 (owner of private ¯rm as Owner 1). There exists a continuum of consumers of the same type
with a utility function linear and separable in the numeraire good. The representative consumer
maximizes U(q0; q1)¡ p0q0 ¡ p1q1, where qi ¸ 0 is the amount of the good i that Firm i produces
and pi is its price (i = 0; 1). We assume that the function U(q0; q1) is quadratic, strictly concave,
and symmetric in q0 and q1:
U(q0; q1) = a(q0 + q1)¡ 12(q
2
0 + 2bq0q1 + q
2
1) a > 0; b 2 (0; 1);
where b represents the degree of product di®erentiation. The speci¯cation implies the following
direct demand function:
qi =
a(1¡ b)¡ pi + bpj
1¡ b2 i; j = 0; 1; i 6= j:
Each ¯rm has an identical technology represented by a constant marginal cost function C(qi) = cqi
(c ¸ 0). The pro¯t function of Firm i is denoted by
¦i = (pi ¡ c)qi i; j = 0; 1; i 6= j;
where qi is given by the above demand function. Social welfare, denoted by W , is measured as the
sum of consumer surplus (denoted by CS) and producer surplus (denoted by PS).
W = CS + PS;
where PS = ¦0 +¦1 and consumer surplus is given by
CS = U(q0; q1)¡ p0q0 ¡ p1q1 = 2a
2(1¡ b) + p20 ¡ 2bp0p1 + p21 ¡ 2a(1¡ b)(p0 + p1)
2(1¡ b2) :
Owner 0 is assumed to be a welfare maximizer, while Owner 1 is assumed to maximize his or her
own pro¯t.
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In addition, This paper focuses on the managerial aspects of ¯rms. Thus, we consider the
situation where the ¯rms' owners decide to delegate control to managers. To formalize managerial
delegation, we follow Lambertini (2000). Each of the owners can assess the performance of his or
her manager according to two readily observable indicators, i.e., the pro¯t and output of the ¯rm.
Following the precedents of the literature on managerial incentive contract, we assume that the
manager of Firm i maximizes the following function Vi(¦i; qi):
Vi(¦i; qi) = ¦i + µiqi µi 2 R; i = 0; 1;
where parameter µi identi¯es the weight attached to the value of sales.3 In this delegation regime,
the manager of Firm i can maximize his or her payo® by choosing the price pi that maximizes Vi.
This can be supported by the assumption that the payo® to the manager of Firm i is represented
as ¸i+¹iVi for some real number ¸i and some positive number ¹i. This type of delegation scheme
functions as a commitment device, since it is common knowledge before the managers compete
against each other.4 Similar to most literature on managerial delegation, we assume that the
e®ect of the managers' payo®s on pro¯ts is negligible, since we emphasize the in°uence of incentive
contracts on market outcomes.
We consider the observable delay game in the context of a price-setting mixed duopoly. Note
that in this model, a preplay stage is added to the normal mixed duopolistic game. In the game,
the ¯rms' owners ¯rst announce in which stage their managers will choose their own prices and
are committed to the choice before the price competition. After both the owners' announcements,
each of the managers sets his or her own price, knowing when the opponent will set his or her own
price.
Formally, the game runs as follows: In the ¯rst stage, Owner i independently chooses ti 2 f3; 4g,
where ti indicates the time at which price pi should be set (i = 0; 1). ti = 3 implies that Firm
i's manager sets his or her own price in the third stage, and ti = 4 implies that he or she sets
his or her own price in the fourth stage. In other words, ti = 3 means that the manager selects
an earlier choice of price, and ti = 4 means that the manager selects the later choice of price. At
the end of the ¯rst stage, the timing-decisions are revealed. In the second stage, Owners 0 and 1
simultaneously set their respective ¯rm's value of µi. In the third stage, the manager of Firm i
selects his or her own price pi when Owner i chooses ti = 3. If the corresponding owner chooses
ti = 4, the manager does nothing at this stage. At the end of the third stage, the manager of the
rival ¯rm j (6= i) that Owner j chooses tj = 4 in the ¯rst stage, observes the value of pi which the
3Even if we replace qi with pi in Vi (i = 0; 1), our results hold.
4Katz (1991) showed general conditions under which unobserved agency contracts can operates as a commitment
device.
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manager of Firm i has already decided. In the fourth stage, the manager of Firm i selects his or
her own price pi when Owner i chooses ti = 4. At the end of the game, the market opens and each
¯rm sells its own product. We adopt a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and thus the game is
solved backward.
3 Results for Endogenous Timing
We analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the above four-stage game. In this regard,
we use a case in which both Owners 0 and 1 set their respective delegation parameters µi to zero
(no-delegation case) as a benchmark to clarify the role of managerial delegation (i = 0; 1).
3.1 Price-setting
In the third and fourth stages, the manager of Firm i chooses his or her price to maximize Vi(¦i; qi).
Since there are three subgames | the simultaneous game (Case S), the sequential game with Firm
0 as the leader (Case L), and the sequential game with Firm 0 as the follower (Case F ) | we
analyze the respective equilibrium. Figure 1 represents the equilibrium points of three cases. In
this ¯gure, point k 2 fS;L; Fg is the equilibrium point in Case k, and Ri(pj) denotes the reaction
curve of Firm i (i; j = 0; 1; j 6= i).
Ri(pj) =
a(1¡ b) + c+ bpj ¡ µi
2
:
V i expresses the iso-payo® curve of the manager of Firm i. This ¯gure shows that the price of each
¯rm is a strategic complement for the other ¯rm's price and the increase in µi shifts the reaction
function Ri(pj) inward.
3.2 Managerial Delegation
In the second stage, the owners of both ¯rms simultaneously choose their delegation parameters to
maximize their objectives. In analogy with the price-setting stages, we should classify the analyses
into Cases S, L, and F .




(2¡ b¡ b2)2(a¡ c) + b3µ1
4¡ 3b2 ; r
S
1 (µ0) = ¡
b2[(2¡ b¡ b2)(a¡ c)¡ bµ0]
4(2¡ b2) :




























Figure 1: Equilibrium points in the price-setting stages
From these equations, the delegation parameters in equilibrium are as follows:5
µS0 =
(1¡ b)(8¡ 8b2 ¡ 2b3 + b4)(a¡ c)
8¡ 8b2 + b4 ; µ
S
1 = ¡
b2(1¡ b)(2¡ b2)(a¡ c)
8¡ 8b2 + b4 :
The equilibrium delegation parameter of Owner 1 is negative for any b 2 (0; 1), whereas that
of Owner 0 is positive in the wide range of b (0 < b < 0:942). This is because Owner 1 prefers
to raise the equilibrium price by shifting his or her reaction function outward for the purpose of
increasing pro¯t. On the other hand, since Owner 0 aims at maximizing social welfare, he or she
wishes to decrease the price in order to increase consumer surplus. However, when b is su±ciently
close to 1 (in other words, the degree of product di®erentiation is su±ciently low), µS0 is negative
because, in this case, the equilibrium prices of both ¯rms are close to the marginal cost c and
more reduction in price leads to excessive decrease in producer surplus. This mechanism can be
explained by comparing it with the no-delegation case as in Figure 2. On the left of this ¯gure,
equilibrium point S moves left by increasing µ0. As a result, Owner 0 can obtain a higher payo®
(social welfare).6 On the other hand, Owner 1 gets a higher payo® (pro¯t) by reducing µ1.
The respective values in the equilibrium are as follows:
pS0 =
2ab(1¡ b) + c(8¡ 2b¡ 6b2 + b4)
8¡ 8b2 + b4 ; p
S
1 =
2a(2¡ 2b¡ b2 + b3) + c(4 + 4b¡ 6b2 ¡ 2b3 + b4)
8¡ 8b2 + b4 ;
¦S0 =
2b(1¡ b)(8 + 2b¡ 8b2 ¡ 2b3 + b4)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(8¡ 8b2 + b4)2 ; ¦
S
1 =
2(1¡ b)(2¡ b2)3(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(8¡ 8b2 + b4)2 ;
CSS =
(40 + 8b¡ 78b2 ¡ 18b3 + 50b4 + 12b5 ¡ 12b6 ¡ 2b7 + b8)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(8¡ 8b2 + b4)2 ;
5Henceforth, we indicate the equilibrium values with superscript k 2 fS;L; Fg.
6The dotted line on the left in Figure 2 represents the reaction function of Firm 0 when its manager maximizes
social welfare.

























































Figure 2: The choice of the delegation parameter in the simultaneous game
WS =
(56 + 8b¡ 114b2 ¡ 14b3 + 74b4 + 6b5 ¡ 16b6 + b8)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(8¡ 8b2 + b4)2 :
Case L. The reaction functions are
rL0 (µ1) =
(8¡ 8b¡ 6b2 + 5b3 + b4)(a¡ c) + b3µ1
8¡ 10b2 + 3b4
rL1 (µ0) = ¡
b2[(1¡ b)(4 + 2b¡ b2)(a¡ c)¡ b(2¡ b2)µ0]
(2¡ b)(2 + b)(4¡ 3b2) :
Thus, the equilibrium delegation parameters are as follows:
µL0 =
(1¡ b)(32¡ 40b2 ¡ 4b3 + 10b4 + b5)(a¡ c)
(2¡ b2)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4) ; µ
L
1 = ¡
2b2(1¡ b)(2¡ b2)(a¡ c)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 :
By analogy to Case S, µL1 < 0 for any b 2 (0; 1), but µL0 > 0 for b 2 (0; 0:978). The reason
for this is similar to that in Case S and is illustrated in Figure 3. For both the owners, the
change of the delegation parameter from zero (Owner 0 raises µ0, while Owner 1 reduces µ1) makes
the equilibrium point move from L to L0. If the opponent does not change his or her delegation
parameter, each owner gets a higher payo® from the change.
The equilibrium prices, pro¯ts, consumer surplus, and social welfare are as follows:
pL0 =
ab(4¡ 4b¡ b2 + b3) + c(16¡ 4b¡ 16b2 + b3 + b4)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ;
pL1 =
a(8¡ 8b¡ 6b2 + 6b3 + b4 ¡ b5) + c(8 + 8b¡ 14b2 ¡ 6b3 + 4b4 + b5)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ;
¦L0 =
b(1¡ b)(2¡ b)(2 + b)(16 + 4b¡ 20b2 ¡ 5b3 + 5b4 + b5)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ;

























































Figure 3: The choice of the delegation parameter in the sequential game (leader: Firm 0)
¦L1 =
(1¡ b)(2¡ b)(2 + b)(4¡ 3b2)(2¡ b2)2(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ;
CSL =
(320 + 64b¡ 784b2 ¡ 176b3 + 684b4 + 164b5 ¡ 251b6 ¡ 59b7 + 33b8 + 7b9)(a¡ c)2
2(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ;
WL =
(448 + 64b¡ 1136b2 ¡ 144b3 + 1012b4 + 108b5 ¡ 369b6 ¡ 31b7 + 47b8 + 3b9)(a¡ c)2
2(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 :
Case F. The reaction functions of both owners are
rF0 (µ1) =
(16¡ 16b¡ 20b2 + 18b3 + 7b4 ¡ 5b5)(a¡ c) + b3(2¡ b2)µ1
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ; r
F
1 (µ0) = 0:
In this case, Owner 1 sets µ1 = 0 independent of µ0. This is because Firm 1 is the Stackelberg
leader in the price-setting stages, and thus, the price change by the managerial delegation does not
increase its pro¯t. This behavior of Owner 1 (pro¯t maximizer) was pointed out by Lambertini
(2000). Therefore, the delegation parameters in the equilibrium of Case F are as follows:
µF0 =
(1¡ b)(2¡ b)(8 + 4b¡ 8b2 ¡ 5b3)(a¡ c)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ; µ
F
1 = 0:
As in the above two cases, Owner 0 chooses a positive µ0 in the wide range of b (0 < b < 0:961).
Figure 4 depicts this mechanism. For example, even though Owner 1 chooses µ1 < 0, the pro¯t of
Firm 1 does not increase, whereas social welfare is improved by setting µ0 > 0.
The equilibrium values in Case F are as follows:
pF0 =
2ab(2¡ 2b¡ b2 + b3) + c(16¡ 4b¡ 16b2 + 2b3 + 3b4)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ;
pF1 =
a(8¡ 8b¡ 6b2 + 6b3) + c(8 + 8b¡ 14b2 ¡ 6b3 + 5b4)
16¡ 20b2 + 5b4 ;

























































Figure 4: The choice of the delegation parameter in the sequential game (leader: Firm 1)
¦F0 =
2b(1¡ b)(2¡ b2)(16 + 4b¡ 20b2 ¡ 4b3 + 5b4)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ;
¦F1 =
2(1¡ b)(2¡ b2)(4¡ 3b2)2(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4)2 ;
CSF =
(10 + 2b¡ 12b2 ¡ 2b3 + 3b4)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4) ; W
F =
(14 + 2b¡ 18b2 ¡ 2b3 + 5b4)(a¡ c)2
(1 + b)(16¡ 20b2 + 5b4) :
3.3 Timing Choice
In the ¯rst stage, both owners determine whether their ¯rms set their own prices at the third or
fourth stage. Matrix 1 represents this situation. Each owner chooses the strategy according to
his or her payo® ranking. Thus, we ¯rst consider the ranking based on the results of the previous
subsection. As a result, we obtain the following lemma.
Owner 1
t1 = 3 t1 = 4
Owner 0
t0 = 3 (WS ; ¦S1 ) (W
L; ¦L1 )
t0 = 4 (WF ; ¦F1 ) (W
S ; ¦S1 )
Matrix 1: The choice of the timing
Lemma 1. In the second stage, the equilibrium values of three cases are ranked as follows:
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(iv) CSF > CSS > CSL and WF > WS > WL.
Since in the no-delegation case the prices of both ¯rms in Cases L and F are higher than those
in Case S, Owner 0 who aims at maximizing social welfare prefers to reduce the prices in order to
increase consumer surplus. Thus, he or she sets the higher delegation parameter in Cases L and
F . On the other hand, since Owner 1 can increase the pro¯t of Firm 1 by reducing the delegation
parameter from zero in Cases S and L, µS1 and µ
L
1 are smaller than µ
F
1 (= 0).
With regard to the equilibrium prices, in Case F , since Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader of
the price-setting stages, Owner 1 cannot increase the pro¯t of Firm 1 by changing the delegation
parameter from zero. Hence, the decision of Owner 0 in the second stage is directly re°ected in
the ensuing behavior of both ¯rms. As a result, pFi is the lowest in the three cases (i = 0; 1).
On the other hand, in Cases S and L, Owner 1 can increase the pro¯t by reducing the delegation










1 = 0, we ¯nd that the
price of Firm 1 in Case L is higher than that in Case S. In addition, it also raises the price of
Firm 0 because in the above price-setting stages, the equilibrium price of Firm 0 is the decreasing
function of µ1. Therefore, pLi is the highest in the three cases.





however, in consumer surplus, the ranking is inverted (CSF > CSS > CSL). Finally, social welfare
is ranked as WF > WS > WL.
Taking into account Lemma 1, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the four-stage game with the manage-
rial delegation, both ¯rms decide their prices simultaneously at the fourth stage (t0 = t1 = 4).
By Lemma 1, Owners 0 and 1 wish to set their ¯rms' prices after the price-setting of their
opponents. Accordingly, both owners have dominant strategies in the ¯rst stage, as described
in Matrix 1, to set prices at ti = 4, and thus, the managers of the ¯rms decide their prices
simultaneously at the fourth stage.
The equilibrium timing of the price-setting in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007) is di®erent than that in the
above proposition. In the former, the owners of both ¯rms wish to set their prices before their
opponents do; however, in the latter, they prefer to set them after their opponents because the
price-setting of each ¯rm occurs only once in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007), whereas both ¯rms twice set
their prices substantially in our model because of managerial delegation. In addition to this, the
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fact that in our model, the objective of the public sector to maximize social welfare is re°ected in
Firm 0 only through the decision of the delegation parameter, also a®ects the result.
In B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007), since the decision for maximizing social welfare is made in the price-
setting stages, the equilibrium prices are in°uenced a great deal by the objective of the Stackelberg




i (i = 0; 1). On the other
hand, in our model, since the decisions of both the owners are entered before the price-setting
stages, the adjustment of the price through the managerial delegation a®ects the result. As a





Since a rise in prices increases the pro¯ts but decreases consumer surplus, Owner 0 prefers the
case in which lower prices are realized. On the other hand, Owner 1 prefers the case in which higher
prices are realized. Accordingly, both the owners have dominant strategies to set their prices in
the fourth stage.
4 Conclusion
This paper examined a model in which a public ¯rm and a private ¯rm set their own prices
sequentially or simultaneously, by focusing on the managerial delegation of ¯rms. We extended
B¶arcena-Ruiz's (2007) setting as an application of the observable delay game of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) by introducing a delegation contract µa la Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas
(1987). In our model, we showed that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, both the public
and the private ¯rms choose their own prices in the later stage. Our result is di®erent from the
result in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007).
In a quantity-setting mixed duopoly, Nakamura and Inoue (2007) extended Pal's (1998) observ-
able delay game by introducing managerial incentive contracts in the same manner as ours. They
showed that Pal's (1998) results are robust against the introduction of the managerial delegation.
In short, they found that two managerial ¯rms sequentially set outputs in equilibrium. However,
in a price-setting mixed duopoly, the result of the observable delay game in the context of mixed
duopoly varies as a result of introducing the delegation contract. The owners of the public and
private ¯rms are reluctant to be the leaders in the case of price competition.
In this paper, we assumed that the technologies of both public and private ¯rms are represented
by the same constant marginal cost functions. It can be easily veri¯ed that the result that both
¯rms' managers decide prices simultaneously in the fourth stage (t0 = t1 = 4) remains unchanged
against the assumption that the public ¯rm is less e±cient than the private ¯rm.
As a valid next step, two extensions of our model can be considered. The ¯rst is to generalize
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the number of (private) ¯rms in the market and the periods of price competition. We restricted
our attention to two ¯rms and two periods in the price competition as in B¶arcena-Ruiz (2007).
Similar to Pal (1998) and Lu (2006), by considering the more generalized observable delay game
in the context of mixed oligopoly, we can discuss the in°uence of the number of the ¯rms and
the degree of product di®erentiation on the equilibrium outcomes. The other possible extension is
to consider the case that some ¯rms are foreign-owned. It seems to more productive to analyze
the model in which foreign shareholders are taken into account. Moreover, as is indicated by Lu
(2006), one generally considers that foreign ¯rms are more e±cient than domestic ones. These
issues are left for future research.
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